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Why should deforestation be stopped?
Why should greenhouse gas emissions be
reduced? To answer moral queries such
as these, one could point to the well-
being of future generations and the sur-
vival of the human species. One could
also appeal to the preservation of biodiver-
sity and the intrinsic value of the natural
world. These two attitudes are indeed dis-
tinct, and many scholars have therefore
differentiated between “anthropocentric”
(also called “homocentric” or “altruistic”)
and “biocentric” (also called “ecocentric”
or “biospheric”) concerns for the envi-
ronment (e.g., Kahn and Friedman, 1995;
Howe et al., 1996; Kahn, 1997, 2006;
Schultz and Zelezny, 1998; Severson and
Kahn, 2010; Hussar and Horvath, 2011;
Steg and de Groot, 2012). Anthropocentric
concerns for the environment are nar-
rowly aimed at preserving the welfare of
humans, while biocentric concerns are
oriented toward protecting non-human
organisms and nature as a whole. While
anthropocentrism can sometimes lead to
pro-environmental attitudes and actions,
biocentrism is more reliably and robustly
related to environmentalism, both for
abstract values and for concrete behav-
iors (e.g., Gagnon Thompson and Barton,
1994; Schultz et al., 2005; Steg et al.,
2005; de Groot and Steg, 2008). This
makes sense, as anthropocentrism pro-
motes the preservation of the environment
as a means to an end rather than an
end in itself. However, biocentrism treats
environmentalism as a moral imperative
independently of its impact on human
flourishing.
In order to promote environmental-
ism, it is crucial to understand how moral
intuitions can be made to resonate with
values related to preserving the natu-
ral world (Markowitz and Shariff, 2012).
Therefore, examining the psychological
foundations of biocentrism promises to
illuminate a path toward a more sustain-
able future. For this goal to be achieved,
the idea of biocentrism must be decon-
structed and operationalized in psycho-
logically meaningful terms. In particular,
biocentrism is unlikely to be a singular
stance; rather, it plausibly consists of at
least two qualitatively distinct attitudes.
First, biocentrism can stem from a desire
to avoid hurting sentient beings (e.g., har-
boring concerns about killing animals).
Second, biocentrism can stem from a
desire to uphold purity in nature (e.g., har-
boring concerns about violating the sanc-
tity or telos of natural kinds). Avoiding
harm and preserving purity have been
identified as two separate forms of moral
concern that rely on functionally distinct
systems of cognitive and emotional pro-
cessing (e.g., Rozin et al., 1999; Haidt
and Joseph, 2004; Young and Saxe, 2011;
Graham et al., 2013). Therefore, the con-
cept of biocentrism potentially obscures
a psychologically important distinction in
environmentalist attitudes.
Subdividing biocentrism into two sep-
arate moral concerns—about harm and
about purity—provides a meaningful
starting point for investigating its psy-
chological underpinnings (Rottman et al.,
in press). Understanding biocentrism
in terms of avoiding harm emphasizes
the importance of extending mental
states and rights to non-human enti-
ties. In particular, the tendency toward
anthropomorphization can enhance
environmentalism because non-humans
are conceptualized as possessing more
humanlike minds, thus having a height-
ened capacity to be harmed (Waytz et al.,
2010). Multiple studies have demonstrated
that anthropomorphizing other species
or nature as a whole increases biocen-
tric beliefs and behaviors (e.g., Bastian
et al., 2012; Butterfield et al., 2012; Tam
et al., 2013). Additionally, taking the
perspective of animals that are being
harmed leads to greater biocentric con-
cerns for the environment (Schultz, 2000).
Biocentric concerns about harming nature
therefore rest on expanded capacities for
person perception and subjective ascrip-
tions of others’ suffering (Gray et al.,
2012), such that the scope of justice is
expanded to include non-human beings.
In this way, biocentrism can arise from the
same psychological processes that produce
anthropocentrism; the only difference is
that they are applied to a broader moral
circle. This could explain why biocentrism
and anthropocentrism are sometimes
found to overlap (e.g., Stern and Dietz,
1994).
Alternatively, biocentrism is some-
times rooted in concerns about purity
or sanctity. In particular, nature can be
conceptualized as a divine creation that
people have a sacred duty to preserve
(Wardekker et al., 2009), and this sanc-
tification of the planet has been shown
to increase pro-environmental beliefs and
behaviors (e.g., Tarakeshwar et al., 2001).
This purity-based construal may be espe-
cially salient for particular populations.
For example, framing environmental
messages in terms of upholding the
purity of the environment increases the
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pro-environmental attitudes of political
conservatives, while harm-based fram-
ings do not exert any effect (Feinberg and
Willer, 2013). Additionally, although this
form of biocentrism is probably predomi-
nant in religious and spiritual individuals
(Sherkat and Ellison, 2007), it is likely
found in secular individuals as well.
Indeed, sanctification often occurs out-
side of theistic settings (Pargament and
Mahoney, 2005), and the treatment of
certain aspects of nature as sacred may
stem from a more general deontologi-
cal tendency to harbor “protected values”
(Baron and Spranca, 1997). Therefore,
biocentrism is sometimes orthogonal to
considerations about harm, arising from
very different psychological processes
than those that produce anthropocentric
concerns.
In sum, biocentrism can be driven by
at least two distinct moral concerns. When
biocentrism is focused on avoiding harm,
it is primarily geared toward protecting
sentient and humanized entities, and it is
likely moderated by individual differences
in the tendency to anthropomorphize
nature. Conversely, when biocentrism is
focused on upholding the purity of the
environment, it primarily operates at a
more systemic level rather than focusing
on the protection of discrete, individuated
entities. Additionally, a purity-based bio-
centrism is likely moderated by individual
differences in spirituality and in tenden-
cies to treat certain objects as possessing
inherent value. The psychological profiles
underlying biocentric environmentalist
attitudes due to harm concerns and due to
purity concerns are therefore very differ-
ent, although they might sometimes co-
occur. Recognizing this distinction carries
substantial implications for the efficacy
of particular forms of environmental-
ist discourse (Rottman et al., in press).
An adequate account of environmental-
ist attitudes requires that the construct of
biocentrism is ultimately replaced by more
nuanced distinctions. Understanding this
aspect of human psychology will serve as
a crucial step in putting an end to defor-
estation, greenhouse gas emissions, and
countless other environmental threats.
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